

## REVIEW OF THE SPACE PROGRAM

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FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 1960

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met at 10:10 a.m., Hon. Overton Brooks (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have been having some interesting testimony in this committee, which is causing us considerable thought. In fact, some of it is causing real concern on the part of members of the committee as to the security and safety of our Nation and what we should do in reference to speeding up the space program.

This morning, therefore, we asked Mr. George V. Allen, Director of the U.S. Information Agency to appear before us and give us the benefit of the information which his agency has accumulated from many parts of the world to show the impact of the Soviet progress in space on the minds of the peoples of the world.

We have in mind the thought that the spectacular character of the Soviet developments is such that it may be having a tremendous impact upon peoples generally and may be affecting our diplomacy and status as a nation in world affairs.

Accompanying Mr. Allen, we have Mr. Harry Carter, General Counsel; Mr. James Halsema, Director of Plans for the Agency; Mr. Oren Stephens, Director of the Office of Research.

We are happy to welcome you gentlemen to this committee. I think this is the first time, Mr. Allen, that we have had the pleasure of having you here before the committee. You have a prepared statement and we will ask you, if you will, to proceed with the statement.

### **STATEMENT OF GEORGE V. ALLEN, DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY HARRY CARTER, GENERAL COUNSEL, JAMES HALSEMA, DIRECTOR OF PLANS; AND OREN STEPHENS, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH**

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the invitation of the committee to appear this morning, particularly since the committee members have shown themselves to be aware of the importance of space programs on world opinion, which is the aspect of the question which most directly concerns the Information Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. I can tell you this, that we on the committee don't feel there is anything going on that is more important than what is going on with regard to space at this hour.

Mr. ALLEN. As an introduction to the subject, you may be interested in a brief history of world reaction to space developments as our Agency has seen it.

Our sources of information include reports from our own offices overseas and from other agencies of this Government. In addition, public opinion polls and analyses are conducted by survey organizations overseas and we frequently have access to the results, just as other countries utilize the various polls taken in the United States. You may be certain, for example, that the Soviet Embassy in Washington keeps Moscow closely informed of the results of Gallup polls taken in the United States. I may add, incidentally, that the Soviet Embassy will also follow with great interest the hearings of this committee.

The successful launching of Sputnik I, created an intensity of reaction throughout the world which has rarely been paralleled by any other single discovery or invention. The public awareness of the first sputnik was almost universal. People in remote areas of even the most remote countries knew of this sensational event within a few days.

The element of drama was, of course, pronounced. The achievement was generally regarded as opening a new era—the era of space. Most people around the world saw it as such.

Added to this drama was the element of shock. The United States had announced, as early as July 25, 1955, our own earth-satellite program, now known as Vanguard. The developments in our program had been reported from time to time in meticulous detail. On the other hand, a low-keyed Soviet announcement implied that the U.S.S.R. would probably launch an earth satellite, with no statement as to when but with some details of proposed weight and orbit. The announcement received little attention in the general or even scientific press of the world.

Consequently, those who were interested in impending satellite launchings generally expected the United States to achieve the first, and perhaps the only, results.

The achievement of placing in orbit the first earth satellite, without great advance fanfare, increased the prestige of the Soviet Union tremendously and produced a corresponding loss of U.S. prestige, due primarily to the contrast. The Soviets were greatly exceeding world expectation of their scientific and technological capacities; we, on the other hand, were falling short of world expectation of us. An important element in underlining this contrast to the rest of the world was the reaction in the United States itself. We, ourselves, seemed confused, dismayed, and shaken by the development. Our own domestic debate helped make the Soviet achievement seem even more significant, and tended to put the whole matter into a framework of U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry.

As time passed, highly colored press and radio treatment of space matters gave way to more sophisticated judgments and more balanced reactions. This welcome change was helped greatly by our successes in launching a series of satellites and obtaining information from them, though our payloads were of a lesser magnitude than those of the Soviet Union.

We also began to see editorials abroad which pointed out the difference between American openness in letting the world in on our

failures as well as our successes, and Soviet failure to announce attempts as well as achievements.

During the 18-month period following the first sputnik, our reports showed that the United States steadily regained prestige. At the same time, the prestige that accompanied Soviet achievements also continued to increase, so our regaining of stature did not approach the commanding position that we had enjoyed before Sputnik I. Furthermore, our failure to equal Soviet accomplishment in the terms the world sees as important—success in placing very large payloads in orbit—made the Soviet program even more impressive.

For a period of many months, the prevailing world opinion seemed to anticipate a kind of seesaw, with first the United States and then the Soviet Union accomplishing some noteworthy activity. This was accompanied by some hopeful notes that the United States would overtake the Soviets in payload weight, guidance accuracy, and so on.

Then came the two dramatic and successful Soviet moon shots, followed by the failure of our own. As a consequence of these events, the seesaw seems to have tipped solidly in the Soviet direction, in world opinion. Today, although we continue to see the hope expressed abroad that the United States will catch up, we also see growing doubt that this is likely during the next 5 or even 10 years.

Except for the most dramatic of space events, the world press now is less inclined to give startling headlines to every development. At the same time, general world interest in space has grown steadily, in both seriousness and depth of coverage—and along with this has been a surge in interest in all aspects of science and technology. Here the United States has an advantage: the vastly greater accessibility of our research, and our general willingness to share our findings with others. These two factors help to sustain our position.

However, we now see increasing speculative stories on what the Soviet Union will do next. There seems to be a prevailing view that the first spacemen will be from the Soviet Union. We have seen wry comments, some made in America, that Americans, landing on the moon, will find Russians there. In other words, the great expectations of American achievements in space are no longer in evidence. Soviet space leadership has been widely accepted.

The implications of this acceptance are important. The world looks at both America and the Soviet Union with new eyes today.

Probably the most significant result of the Soviet successes is a change in the overall impression of the people of the world about the Soviet Union. In public opinion parlance, we speak of this as the revised Soviet image. The change goes beyond the field of space technology. It covers all of Soviet science and technology, plus Soviet military power and general standing.

Before Sputnik I, few people of the free world believed the Soviet Union was currently in a position to challenge America in the broad fields of science, technology, and production. Now, the sputniks and luniks are taken as evidence that the Soviet Union is able to challenge America successfully in all these fields, including even production.

It is hardly an overestimate to say that space has become for many people the primary symbol of world leadership in all areas of science and technology.

Some science and engineering students are being attracted to the Soviet Union for this reason. Soviet technological and cultural ex-

ports are getting a better reception around the world. Soviet scientists and technicians are being accorded greater prestige, are speaking with increased authority, and are being listened to more attentively.

One interesting—and perhaps dangerous—effect of Soviet success in space has been the new credibility it has lent to Soviet claims in these other fields. Before sputnik, most Soviet pronouncements of spectacular achievements were usually dismissed as propaganda. Since sputnik, their claims have been much more often believed.

Premier Khrushchev, in a speech at Krasnoyarsk on October 9, 1959, following his return from the United States, made this statement:

The Americans now frankly admit their lag behind the Soviet Union in several most important fields. Today, for instance, I read a statement by American General Medaris, head of the chief technical and rocket administration of the United States. He says that, should the Soviet Union suspend its space program, the United States would need 3 to 5 years to catch up with us or to overtake us. This is a valuable and sensible admission.

The principal danger in the situation seems to me to be the cockiness which these successes have engendered in Soviet officials themselves. If it were a question merely of competition in scientific achievement, no one could properly begrudge the Soviets their magnificent successes, any more than we should begrudge their economic progress. Now should one begrudge their new-found feeling of self-confidence. Most foreigners who visited America during the first half of the 19th century found our self-confidence showing on every side. However, if this new-found Soviet cockiness (arrogance is not too strong a word) translates itself into adventuresomeness in foreign affairs, the world is in for a good deal of trouble.

Even though Soviet officials, themselves, have generally sought to present their space program as peaceful and scientific, the world public's reaction has been to read into space activities a military implication. Premier Khrushchev's statement that the U.S.S.R. has now shown that it can hit any spot on the earth's surface, found an echo in an editorial in the Danish newspaper, *Information*, on September 14, 1959. Commenting on the Soviet success in hitting the moon, this editorial declared, " \* \* \* now we know \* \* \* that an H-bomb-carrying rocket can, with precision, hit New York."

Attached to this statement are representative excerpts from other editorial opinion. Worth particular note is the comment by Berliner Morgenpost, also of September 14:

If we had to choose between freedom and moon rocket, we would choose freedom. However, we need not make such a choice because the United States will accomplish a moon shot tomorrow or the day after.

Obviously, to maintain this confidence in us, we must push forward vigorously with space exploration.

Many people of the world are showing growing concern over the potential military dangers of an unchecked space race, and there is widespread concern over the need for international agreements to assure that space will be explored for peaceful purposes only.

All space activities are now seen within the framework of Soviet-American competition. Regardless of how Americans may feel about it, the world sees the United States in a space race with the U.S.S.R. Recent British interest in instrumenting an earth satellite is a helpful

development. More international activity in space will tend to interest more people in international control.

In summary, I should like to respond to the committee's specific question on the "importance our space program may have as a factor in international relations, world prestige, and in the minds of peoples of other countries, by concluding that our space program has an importance far beyond the field of the activity itself, that it bears on almost every aspect of our relations with people of other countries and on their view of us as compared with the U.S.S.R. Our space program may be considered as a measure of our vitality and our ability to compete with a formidable rival, and as a criterion of our ability to maintain technological eminence worthy of emulation by other peoples.

(The attachment to Mr. Allen's statement is as follows:)

#### PRESS QUOTATIONS ON U.S.-U.S.S.R. SPACE ACTIVITIES

##### BRITAIN

"Indeed, it may be doubted whether Mr. Khrushchev, accorded full honors as a head of State, would now be leaving for Washington had not the first sputnik 2 years ago shocked the United States into a dire, if grudging, admission that Russia, in some respects held a commanding lead in the conquest of space" (Times, Sept. 14, 1959).

"[The Soviets] have proved themselves the Columbuses of the space age \* \* \* they deserve to be congratulated \* \* \* but \* \* \* the rocket has political as well as scientific implications. The timing \* \* \* was designed to make it clear that Mr. Khrushchev is talking from strength, not weakness \* \* \*. The Russians have gained such a tremendous prestige advantage they can afford to be generous" (Guardian, Sept. 15 1959).

"In putting a space vehicle on the moon the Russians have provided the most complete, as well as the most dramatic, proof of the length of the lead that they now hold in accuracy of launching and control. The rocket, in Soviet hands, has become a precision instrument" (Times, Sept. 15, 1959).

##### DENMARK

"One may say that one should not be surprised, either because the moon was reached or because the Russians came first \* \* \*. But \* \* \* it makes a difference that it has, in fact, taken place \* \* \* every little human being, in the very instant when the Soviet ruler sets his feet on American soil, must have told himself that now we know \* \* \* that an H-bomb carrying rockets can, with precision hit New York \* \* \*" (Copenhagen's information Sept. 14, 1959).

##### FRANCE

"It is with the purpose of putting all the trump cards on his side in his secret ambitions that Khrushchev sent the new rocket to the moon over the weekend. It is to make it quite clear to the Americans that he is not the representative of a backward country but of a power at least equal to the United States and Khrushchev staged the successful lunar shot" (Paris-Journal, Sept. 14, 1959).

##### GERMANY

"If we had to choose between freedom and moon rocket, we would choose freedom. However, we need not make such a choice because the United States will accomplish a moon shot tomorrow or the day after. As far as the military balance of power is concerned, lunik is not decisive in the close race between two world powers" (Berliner Morgenpost, Sept. 14, 1959).

##### ITALY

"It is clear that the country that can hit the moon with a rocket may more easily drop an H-bomb on New York or San Francisco. Now the Russians as

well as the Americans possess the weapon of terror. Nuclear war would mean the end of everyone and everything" (Milan's La Stampa, Nov. 3, 1959).

"The latest moonshot \* \* \* frightens no one and \* \* \* does not alter the political balance between the two coalitions" (Rome's Il Tempo, Sept. 13, 1959).

## TURKEY

"In order to eliminate the impatience and disappointment of the public, the responsible statesmen announce that America is superior to Russia from the military viewpoint. But the fact remains that America has been left behind in the space race, and the commencing of the President's trip in this atmosphere of failure casts a shadow on the American public \* \* \*" (Yeni Sabah, Dec. 2, 1959).

"\* \* \* The Soviets, which advanced speedily in the fields of atomic and hydrogen weapons and guided missiles, have left America behind by launching the first rocket to the moon. It is probable that after these last events, a coordination will be undertaken between the American military research branches."

"\* \* \* By letting the Russians get ahead in the space race, America has created a situation which could weaken her on the political front also" (Cumhuriyet, Sept. 15, 1959).

## GREECE

"In spite of the Soviet effort to attribute political importance to the moon rocket, Lunik II is a step toward the conquest of space and an historic scientific accomplishment. However, there still remains much to be done before man reaches the moon. Launching of the U.S. moon satellite is expected by scientists as a far more important accomplishment than the moon rocket" (Ethnikes Kyrix, Sept. 15, 1959).

"The entire world rejoices over the scientific achievements and would be even happier if world antagonism were confined to creating conditions for the further development of man's knowledge. This joy, however, is reduced by the fact that the Soviet achievement was aimed at underlining Soviet supremacy and strength \* \* \* Soviet boastings may serve to awaken the Western peoples and demonstrate once more Soviet political methods" (Kathimerai, Sept. 15, 1959).

## INDIA

"The feat no doubt has its political and strategic advantages for the Soviet Union. \* \* \* As far as the layman is concerned, the best hope the Russian conquest of the moon holds out is that the nuclear powers of the world will now realize the virtual limitlessness of man's power and the utter futility of a war in such circumstances" (Free Press Journal, September 1959).

"It is no mere coincidence that the Russians should have launched such a rocket on the eve of Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States for doubtless they wish to demonstrate to the world and to America in particular their scientific superiority" (Express).

## GHANA

"This is a scientific achievement of the greatest magnitude. Russian scientists \* \* \* have given positive proof of their scientific and technological superiority" (Ghana Times, Sept. 15, 1959).

## URUGUAY

"That Soviet science and Soviet effort should have achieved this triumph is, in the opinion of those with a limited vision, a threat to humanity \* \* \*. We will not apply such a limited criteria. Science is universal, developed by men for men \* \* \*" (Accion, Oct. 29, 1959).

## COLOMBIA

"Over and above the confusion being created by Russian propaganda on satellites and rockets, one should try to distinguish the issues in order to avoid overlooking the moral and political misery which are hidden behind such undeniable achievements" (El Colombiano, Nov. 4, 1959).

"As far as rockets are concerned, it is unquestionable that the Russians are much ahead of the North Americans, for they have at their disposal all the resources of the Red Government \* \* \*" (El Colombiano, Nov. 30, 1959).

## URUGUAY

"It is unquestionable that, for the time being, the Soviets have achieved an advantage over all other countries through successful attempts with space rockets, although these successes were achieved after failures, such as those the United States has recently experienced, without the world knowing about them" (La Manana, Nov. 28, 1959).

## BURMA

"It must now be definitely conceded, that the U.S.S.R. has now, even if it is for the time being, positively outstripped the United States in the development of rocket missiles with the last Saturday's successful launching of the Soviet cosmic missile, Lunik II, to the moon. Congratulations had poured into Russia from all quarters and, indeed, she must be deemed well deserved for the outstanding achievement of the age" (The Guardian, Sept. 14, 1959).

## THAILAND

"A few days before Khrushchev left for the United States Moscow announced the successful shooting of a rocket to the moon. Though this is a great scientific achievement Khrushchev must be fully aware that he can no longer use such achievements to intimidate the opposite side because it has been seen that the race is rather even and neither side can be said to really have surpassed the other" (Prachatipatai, Sept. 23, 1959).

## THE PHILIPPINES

"The comparative pattern of the United States and Russian space probes is beginning to be clear. While the Russians place accent on a further reach—that is, the further the better—the United States appears more intent on exploring and conquering the problems of one stage before proceeding to the next. It should not be hard to predict how the race will wind up" (Herald, Oct. 15, 1959).

## CAMBODIA

"The United States is the only country beside the U.S.S.R. that can put up satellites, but undeniably, the United States is now behind. The United States may one day duplicate this Soviet feat, if she is willing to cooperate or compete with the Russian" (Mien Hon, Oct. 6, 1959).

## INDONESIA

"The Soviet Union scientists' success in launching the moon rocket represents a great victory in the scientific race in the field of outer space. This brilliant success will strengthen the Eastern bloc's position on the present chessboard of international politics" (Suluh Indonesia, Sept. 17, 1959).

## MALAYA

"Lunik is a wonderful scientific achievement. The successful shooting of Lunik at the moon has established Russia as the most advanced country in the world of science" (Utusan Melayu, Sept. 15, 1959).

## JAPAN

"It is now clear that Moscow is one lesson ahead of America at least in the field of long-range rockets, though of course it may be that America still is in the lead as far as overall military strength is concerned" (Yomiuri, Sept. 14, 1959).

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Allen, for your statement. It is certainly a most reasonable, and most interesting statement. It doesn't mince words, but gives us your viewpoint based on information which you no doubt have obtained throughout the world.

How many offices of information, by the way, do you have?

Mr. ALLEN. Throughout the world we have about 160 U.S.I.S. posts, in capitals and in principal cities. Also, in addition, we are

very closely associated with other activities, mostly in Latin America, called binational centers. There are a hundred of those—fifty, I believe, in Brazil, alone.

NOTE.—As of January 15, 1960, Brazil has 54 binational centers of which 16 have American grantees, the rest are run by locals.

Those are institutions which we support by supplying usually an English teacher or a director, but they are maintained primarily by the local community of Americans and the people of Rio, or Buenos Aires, Tegucigalpa or wherever it may be.

The CHAIRMAN. You state, on page 7 of your report, this:

However, if this new-found Soviet cockiness—arrogance is not too strong a word—translates itself into adventuresomeness in foreign affairs, the world is in for a good deal of trouble.

Now, isn't that a rather conservative statement of yours?

Mr. ALLEN. It is an understatement, sir, but I think it carries the full implication of the mischief which would result if the Soviet authorities began to feel that their preeminence in space entitled them to throw their weight around in international relations.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, what you really mean there is that if they throw their weight around as a result of these achievements, it will probably lead to war?

Mr. ALLEN. If it translated itself into actual physical aggression, I can see no other result.

The CHAIRMAN. Then there is a serious danger aside from actually the physical strength vis-a-vis the United States and Russia, there is a serious danger of provoking a war by the feeling internationally held of weakness on our part?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, but I should make it clear in the record that I do not expect the Soviet authorities to engage in military aggression because of their feeling of superiority in the space field. I don't see any reason to think that that is likely to be the result.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it has already provoked certain cockiness on the part of Mr. Khrushchev because of his pronouncements already made as to the Russian achievements. That is true, isn't it?

Mr. ALLEN. That is true, sir, although I point to the statement which I have already made, and which I think is perhaps proper for us Americans to keep in mind. I have been reading recently reports on foreign travelers who came to the United States between 1800 and 1850. Almost a universal refrain goes through their comments about the United States.

We seemed to think we were destined for the greatest possible future. "Horizons unlimited" was our point of view. We were cockey.

The Soviet people are still in a revolutionary frame of mind. It is lessening somewhat, but with their achievements in space, they naturally feel very pleased with themselves.

I don't think we should reach the conclusion that they are going to undertake military aggression to achieve domination in the world, although we would be foolish if we didn't do everything we could to prevent any such actions from succeeding, if by any chance it became their policy.

The CHAIRMAN. I may differ with you just a little bit in feeling that the Soviets ought to be pleased with themselves. I think the

reverse. Perhaps in the accomplishments in the space age, they should be pleased, but not completely. I don't think they should be pleased a bit.

Mr. ALLEN. I agree, overall.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the Soviet achievement greatest throughout the world, generally? Is it greatest among the educated people or is it greatest among the illiterate people?

Mr. ALLEN. I don't have any figures on that, except as you might judge by countries. I don't believe you can find a very consistent pattern insofar as educational standards or economic development are concerned.

However, here is a question asked by various polling organizations, some of them Gallup affiliates between June 1958 and March 1959. The question is this:

All things considered, do you think the United States or Russia is ahead in total military strength at the present time? Considerably ahead, or only a little?

These have been totaled to show the net favorable attitude that the United States is ahead and the net favorable attitude that the Soviet Union is ahead.

In March 1959, a survey conducted among college students in Vietnam was very favorable to the United States. Thirty-two percent more were favorable toward the United States than toward the Soviet Union, as regards their opinion as to who was ahead in military strength.

In Greece, a survey among the general population gave the United States a 20-percent advantage.

In Italy, the general population gave the United States a net advantage of 15 percent.

That means counting the ones who thought the United States was far ahead or who thought we were slightly ahead, as against the total of those who thought Russia was slightly ahead or way ahead. We do not count those who had no opinion.

In Okinawa, 14 percent. In Uruguay, 4 percent. In West Germany, 1 percent. In Japan, we were minus 1 percent. In Turkey, minus 2 percent. In France, minus 10 percent. And in Great Britain, minus 15 percent.

Of those countries I mentioned, the net favorable impression about the U.S. superiority in total overall military strength was 5.8 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. That is on the plus side?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, does the interest in space extend to areas, we would say, that are remote from civilization? For instance, the areas in the darkest parts of Africa?

Mr. ALLEN. That was something which rather surprised us. We found that knowledge of the fact that the Russians had put up the first sputnik spread with amazing rapidity to most remote areas. It was such a spectacular piece of news that it spread very rapidly.

I don't believe interest in Nepal or Laos or places of that kind is nearly as intense as in countries which are more advanced in scientific matters, but the news of space developments is astonishingly widespread.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you quote Ghana here, and I would assume, therefore, that even in Africa and the jungles of Brazil, there is knowledge of what is being done. Is that correct?

Mr. ALLEN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chenoweth.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Mr. Allen, what sort of story are we putting out in our Information Service? Are we doing anything that might in any way imply that we are a second rate nation or that we are behind Russia in any sense? Just what type of approach are we making to this problem?

Mr. ALLEN. We are highlighting, of course, every success the United States has in space or in general scientific developments, and we have had some rather remarkable ones. We seek to remind the world, for example, every time we get a chance that seven out of the eight earth satellites at the present moment spinning around the earth, are American.

People tend to overlook that when they hear about the Soviets' photographing or hitting the moon.

Mr. CHENOWETH. How much time do you spend impressing that point upon them?

Mr. ALLEN. Every time the occasion arises, we repeat it. One of the most spectacular recent advances in science was the trip of the submarine *Nautilus* under the icecap of the North Pole.

Fortunately, we had excellent pictures of that. The commander of the ship brought them out under his arm. You may recall that he flew back here and was decorated by the President. We developed those pictures and made a film within 2 days. Within 4 days we shipped 150 copies of the film around the world. It showed the submarine going down under the icecap, off Alaska.

Shots were taken through the periscope of the bottom of the ice, looking back as the sub came out, and so forth. It made a spectacular picture. We put it in newsreels in theaters all over the world.

Whenever we have something to talk about, you can be sure we play it to the utmost.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Is it a fact that the Russians are better at propaganda than we are?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, they have certain advantages in propaganda which we have to admit and have to face up to. Any totalitarian regime can control not only the news output of the country in its press and radio, but also the statements of its public figures.

I have some interesting excerpts from Soviet propaganda on space here in my hand, selected from Soviet radio programs. The Russians don't even have to write their script to show the world how far they are ahead in space. They just copy editorials from American newspapers, or articles by American columnists, or statements in the Congress of the United States. The Russians say, "This isn't what we are telling you people around the world. This is what the Americans, themselves, are saying."

Mr. CHENOWETH. You don't put anything like that out over our service?

Mr. ALLEN. No; not like that.

Mr. CHENOWETH. We hope you are not.

Mr. ALLEN. At the same time, we report the fact, for example, that this committee is looking into the space situation. It is legitimate

news which we have to publish, and I think we should. We have got to develop credibility if we want people to listen to the Voice of America or to look at what we are putting out. If they think that we are putting out a one-sided story and not giving a balanced picture of the situation in the United States, they are going to pay no attention to our material.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Your statement, Mr. Allen, seems to carry the implication with it that it is generally recognized in these countries that we are far behind the Russians in this space race and that it will take several years to catch up and, therefore, we have suffered a tremendous loss of prestige. Is that the actual situation in these countries as you find it?

Mr. ALLEN. That is as honest a statement as I can make, sir.

Mr. CHENOWETH. We had Mr. Merchant, the Under Secretary of State, before us a few days ago and he said:

Our own achievements negate any contention that scientific and technical leadership on any broad front is passed in the Soviet Union.

There is apparently some difference of opinion.

Mr. ALLEN. I want to emphasize, Mr. Chenoweth, that I am describing public opinion in foreign countries to the best of the information of my Agency. That doesn't mean that foreign countries may not be mistaken. They may be. But the impression in foreign countries is that the Soviets have taken a very great lead. And I must say that they have gained that impression largely from statements made in the United States.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Which I think are most unfortunate. I think the time is here when we are going to have to think pretty realistically on this whole situation. I personally am getting sort of fed up with hearing prominent men going up and down the country saying that we are a second-rate nation and are now subject to the will of the Russians, that we are at their mercy.

I just don't subscribe to that theory and I haven't heard or seen anything before our committee which would lend any credence to any such proposition, at all, from the military standpoint or any other standpoint.

In certain phases of the space program perhaps the Russians are a little ahead of us. I don't think that is of any great significance. They probably have a little greater thrust and they can shoot an intercontinental ballistic missile a few miles further than we can—I am not even sure they can do that.

I am just wondering whether we are putting our best foot forward, Mr. Allen, in your proposal of telling the world just what we are doing.

Mr. ALLEN. I think, Mr. Chenoweth, we are making a very good presentation of American scientific development.

I was asked by this committee to report as honestly as I could what the foreign attitude is and I have done it. I myself think foreign people have generally exaggerated the Soviet lead. That is why the USIA continues to remind people overseas of the very significant successes we have had. I repeat that seven out of the eight earth satellites at the present moment are American, but this is recalled by a lot of people abroad.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Then you must confess to this committee, that up to this time your efforts have failed to make this impression abroad?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes; they have failed.

Mr. CHENOWETH. What can you do to correct that situation?

Mr. ALLEN. This is another instance in which a government information agency is expected to do things that it cannot do.

Foreign people get their major impression about the United States, not from what the USIA says, but from what they read in their own newspapers, from their own correspondents in the United States who are reporting the U.S. scene as they see fit, or from statements by their own spokesmen or by their own people who have visited the United States, or from quotations from American public figures.

The U.S. Information Agency is trying to do everything it possibly can to supply information to foreign news agencies and newspapers and radio stations and television stations of what is going on in the United States.

But the major impression foreigners get about the United States is not going to be from what the U.S. Information Agency hands out. That doesn't mean to say that we are not worthwhile. Far from it. The need for our activity increases, in my honest opinion, constantly. But we ought not to delude ourselves into thinking that we can change the attitude of the world by our handouts.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Let me ask you another question: Who prepares these programs that deal with our space effort and our entire missile and satellite program?

Mr. ALLEN. We use various media of information—all the mass media we can lay hands on. Perhaps the best known is the radio, the Voice of America.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Don't you have any technical people or scientists down there who could prepare some of these programs and give you the specific details?

Mr. ALLEN. I have my science adviser for radio, press, motion pictures, exhibits, television, and so forth, Mr. Harold Goodwin, here with me. We put out information in all of these fields.

I have brought with me a packet of books we have put out in cooperation with the National Science Foundation. It contains American scientific books that we send abroad. This little shelf of books contains two on the specific subject of space, "The World in Space," and "Satellite Rockets in Outer Space." Those are types of books we have in our reading rooms and libraries dealing with the subject of science.

Mr. CHENOWETH. May I inquire if you have any staff who are peculiarly trained and equipped to prepare programs dealing with space?

Mr. ALLEN. We work with the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and other people who have scientific staffs, but Mr. Goodwin will tell you about the specific experts we have to prepare this material.

**STATEMENT OF HAROLD L. GOODWIN, SCIENCE ADVISER,  
U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY**

Mr. GOODWIN. Mr. Chenoweth, in each of our media we have people who are competent in the field of science. They are roughly the same

kind of people that the news services and wire services have in reporting science. However, our principal source is outside of the agency. We have a contract with the National Academy of Science, for example, whereby we can call on the Academy for any expertise the American citizen can ask on a given question.

We have very close relationships with all the scientific agencies of Government. In the field of space, our primary resources are the space agency, the Department of Defense—as the Department of Defense military space activities become newsworthy—and in addition, the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences.

So instead of attempting to originate all of this material with our limited staff, we go to the experts who know most about it.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Wouldn't it pay you to employ someone on your own staff to devote more time and attention to this program?

Mr. GOODWIN. Well, sir, if we did not have all of the sources we have outside of the Agency, this would be properly indicated, but we have had no difficulty at all in getting a good volume——

Mr. CHENOWETH. Who coordinates all this information that you get?

Mr. GOODWIN. It is coordinated by science officers in the various media services.

Mr. CHENOWETH. You have no one assigned exclusively to space, then?

Mr. GOODWIN. Yes, sir; we have. We have one man who is full time at the space agency, whose function is to channel into the Agency all materials that come from the space agency and from the scientific community.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Then he actually prepares the program?

Mr. GOODWIN. No; the programs are prepared by the various media. For example, the Voice of America program might be prepared by Mr. Joseph Lubin who is an extremely competent science editor in the Voice.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Some years ago I was chairman of a subcommittee that investigated some of the programs, and we were amazed at the type of material going out over the Voice of America at that time. I hope it has improved since then.

Mr. ALLEN. Let me recall, Mr. Chenoweth, that I sat before you at that time. I was in charge of it 10 years ago, when this investigation came up.

Mr. CHENOWETH. I think you have improved it, Mr. Allen, honestly. I haven't heard any complaint lately, but you will remember what we were really up against.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sisk.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Allen, I would like to inquire as to some specifics, if you wish to make any comment on them. We have right on our doorsteps some rather peculiar reactions. I am curious as to whether you have any comment on this impact of the so-called feeling of cockiness, and that it is now good sport to pull Uncle Sam's whiskers, so to speak.

I am referring to certain things occurring down in Cuba, and also I think within the past few days, a reported incident where Mr. Trujillo has apparently done an about-face and now thinks Mr. Fidel Castro is possibly a great world hero.

Would you comment on whether or not you feel that this cockiness and, to some extent, this loss of world prestige by the United States may have caused some of this. Or to what extent it has a bearing?

Mr. ALLEN. That is a very natural question, Mr. Sisk.

However, my answer is no, and I will tell you why. For a hundred years, Britannia ruled the waves. During those hundred years, local politicians in various countries got the greatest pleasure in twisting the British lion's tail. The more outstanding a nation like the United States, or the Soviet Union, or Great Britain is, the more kudos a local politician will get by saying, "See what a brave man I am. I have shaken my fist at the great United States." Perhaps the Soviet Union will begin to come in for it soon. I don't think the fact that people in Panama, or Cuba, or various places are "plucking the eagle's feathers" means a lack of prestige for the United States.

I think it would tend to indicate the contrary.

Mr. SISK. You mentioned in the poll which you discussed a little while ago about the results, I believe, from Uruguay, which led me to feel possibly that the old idea that a man is not without honor, say in his own country, or in his own neighborhood, might have some bearing.

Uruguay, I believe, had a minus. It had some 4 percent minus, in spite of the fact that in some of the southern Asian countries they indicated we were substantially ahead, or substantially more powerful than Russia.

I was curious to know as to what extent in Latin America and in these areas, specifically within our own ball park, so to speak, there is a feeling of concern about our position.

Mr. ALLEN. As it happens, Uruguay was 4 percent plus, but you are still correct in that Uruguay was much lower than Vietnam, or Greece.

Mr. SISK. I am sorry. I thought you said 4 percent minus, but it was still some 4 percent plus in Uruguay.

Mr. ALLEN. Yes.

There doesn't seem to be any particular pattern. Uruguay is the only country in Latin America in this tabulation, but I don't see how you can make a great deal out of it because in countries like Italy, for example, they are 15 percent plus, and Great Britain is 15 percent minus.

France is 10 percent minus. Those are countries right next to each other. I think it has a lot to do perhaps with political relations at the moment, or the evidence of American military strength they happen to see.

Now, my guess would be that the reason Vietnam is so high is that there is a good deal of evidence of American military activity in the Far East, and there is a military advisory group in Vietnam, itself.

Mr. SISK. You have more or less answered the next question I have in mind: Do you see any particular significance with reference to areas of the world, then, in this matter?

Do you find that in, let's say, southeastern Asia, our prestige may be somewhat higher, than it is in Western Europe, or than it is in Africa, or that Africa is higher than it is in South America?

You apparently do not find this in areas.

Mr. ALLEN. No, because two countries in the Far East, for example—Vietnam and Cambodia, right next door to each other—might supply a very different result. It depends somewhat on the political orientation of the country. Wishful thinking always goes into these matters.

Mr. SISK. I believe you did read the specific questions that were asked.

Now, did these questions have to do with the standing of the United States, vis-a-vis Russia in space or in overall strength?

Mr. ALLEN. This was total military strength.

Mr. SISK. That is what would be of some concern to me because I think certainly we have never made any admission—at least that I know of—and I think it would be most unfortunate if anyone had to admit that Russia was stronger than we are in overall military strength.

That is the thing that troubles me a bit. I don't think there is any question our people will admit that in the specific field of thrust, in the space program, Russia is somewhat ahead of us. I think we all have to admit that. But in the overall military, I am somewhat curious as to whose propaganda they are buying because I do not think that out of the United States is coming propaganda that would indicate we admit inferiority in overall military strength.

Mr. ALLEN. Not at all.

Mr. SISK. Are the Russians quoting statements of the United States that would indicate that fact?

Mr. ALLEN. No. The unfortunate part is that Soviet achievements in space get translated in people's minds into an overall superiority in other scientific and technological fields—and in the military field.

I personally think they are wrong—that is, the opinion of peoples around the world as regards relative military strength, but my responsibility is to try to report as accurately as I can, what the people do think.

Mr. SISK. I appreciate that, Mr. Allen, and I think you have done a very fine job. I am sorry I wasn't here to hear your statement, but I have briefly read it here, and none of these questions are inclined to be critical. I am just concerned that in some way we have not been able to differentiate in the minds of the people—and maybe it is impossible to do—the progress in so-called peaceful exploration of outer space. That is all we have ever talked about, peaceful exploration of outer space, and, generally, I think even the Russian, so far as outer space is concerned, refers to it as being peaceful. But, then, because they seem to be somewhat more advanced—and I think because they started earlier in this particular field—then they are ahead in everything.

I am not blaming you for not being able to unsell them on that idea, Mr. Allen, but to me that is of some concern and that is why I was glad to have your statement.

Mr. ALLEN. I would like to say, Mr. Sisk, at this point that while I think the opinions of people in other countries are important and that we ought to try as best we can to keep our finger on the pulse of public opinion in other countries, nevertheless we have seen through experience that public opinion changes rather rapidly. Therefore, I would not exaggerate the importance of opinion at any particular moment.

Moreover even if an overwhelming majority of people say they

think the Soviet Union has more overall military strength than the United States, that doesn't necessarily mean that they think the Soviet Union would come out on top in a war. If you had taken a poll in 1939 of opinion in the United States as between the military strength of Germany and Great Britain, the vast majority of people would have said that the Germans had much more military strength than Great Britain, but if you had asked another question, who do you think would win in a war, there might have been quite a different answer.

I think all these figures ought to be considered in their proper perspective.

Mr. SISK. I think your statement has been very good, Mr. Allen, and, of course, I would hope that we in this committee and in the Congress might be able to do everything possible to strengthen our hand in attempting to present the true picture to the world.

I think no one in this country concedes that Russia is ahead of us in overall strength. I think it is unfortunate that they have taken these few rather extraordinary accomplishments of Russia and have thus been able to calculate that Russia is way ahead. To me, this is an unfortunate thing. I would hope that your agency would proceed to do everything that you can, of course, to do away with this type of feeling. I assume that that is your prime objective, is it not?

Mr. ALLEN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. SISK. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Van Pelt.

Mr. VAN PELT. Mr. Allen, would you explain this plus and minus in public opinion polls, please?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, sir.

The questions asked are usually of this type:

All things considered, do you think the United States or Russia is ahead in total military strength at the present time. Considerably ahead, or only a little?

Now here is a statistic from Great Britain, for example: In November 1957, 4 percent thought that the United States was considerably ahead of Russia. Fifteen percent thought that the United States was a little bit ahead. Thirty-one percent thought that Russia was a little bit ahead, and 19 percent thought that Russia was considerably ahead. Six percent thought they were equal and 25 percent had no opinion.

In order to strike a balance, we take the figures of 4 percent who thought the United States was way ahead and 15 percent who thought we were slightly ahead to make a total of 19 percent who gave us the edge. But then 31 percent thought Russia was slightly ahead and 19 percent way ahead. So that made a total of 50 percent who gave Russia the edge.

You strike off the ones who thought we were equal and who had no opinion, and subtract the ones who gave us the edge from the ones who gave the Russians the edge and we get a balance of minus 31 against the United States and in favor of Russia.

Now, that was November 1957, or 1 month after they launched their first sputnik. This is a dramatic illustration of the impact of their getting up the first earth satellite. The next month, the British gave the Russians a 31 percent overall military advantage.

Exactly 11 months later, after we had put up several, the Russian advantage had dropped to minus 15 percent in Great Britain.

In West Germany, however, the Americans were ahead of Russia by a net of 15 in November 1957, just after sputnik. Maybe it took the Germans a little bit longer to form an opinion. Eleven months later, we had dropped to practically even. How to explain that is difficult.

Mr. VAN PELT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Karth.

Mr. KARTH. On page 5 you speak of revised public opinion toward Russia. I think you have explained some of my questions but generally that might not be true. Is this revised public opinion toward Russia's overall capabilities becoming greater by the day, less, or is it remaining about the same since Sputnik I?

Mr. ALLEN. It has waxed and waned, but at the present moment my impression is that it is waxing, as a result of the moonshots.

When they first put up an earth satellite, we began to talk very excitedly about it, and pressures built up for us to get up one ourselves. Finally, when we tried and didn't succeed, Russian prestige, went way up. It was a sort of shock effect. Then gradually, as we began to put them up, people began to recover and say, "Well, the United States, of course, is going to catch up once it puts its mind to it." There was a much more balanced attitude, and people would say, "This thing is going to seesaw one way or another."

At the present moment the Russians have had the last word. They are the ones who hit the moon and photographed its back side, and the pendulum is swinging in their direction. My guess is that the only way we can recover is to make a spectacular success.

Mr. KARTH. Have any foreign countries changed their attitude in the sense that they are less chummy today, as a result of some of these spectacular Soviet achievements than they were prior to them?

Mr. ALLEN. Less chummy with us?

Mr. KARTH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ALLEN. I don't think so.

Mr. KARTH. You say you don't think so. There is some evidence of it, though?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, their attitude toward the United States in general—whether they would like to be friendly or allied with us—depends on a lot more things than just space technology. It depends on whether the United States follows a policy that they feel is in their national interests, in the United Nations, or in helping less-developed countries develop themselves, and so forth. Those things determine whether a country feels close to the United States and supports the American position internationally.

Mr. KARTH. These spectacular space achievements of the Russians have had no significant effect that you can see at all?

Mr. ALLEN. I don't think so.

I used the illustration of 1939. If you had taken a poll in the United States, I think a large majority of people would have said that Germany had the superior military might over Great Britain, but that wouldn't mean that the Americans were going to side with Germany.

Mr. KARTH. I understand, sir.

You say that Russia gets a great deal of their propaganda—and I am one of those who feel that propaganda is just as devastating as a missile on various occasions—they get a great deal of their propaganda from newspaper stories here at home and speeches, et cetera.

Would you advocate more secrecy, less secrecy, or about the same kind of public dissemination of opinion as we now have?

Mr. ALLEN. I would not advocate more legislation or regulations concerning secrecy. I would plead for a more adult attitude on the part of both executive and legislative officials in pronouncements regarding space and in statements about what we are going to achieve. If we could take a somewhat more calm attitude on the subject, we would present a better image abroad. For a time, we bordered almost on hysteria on the subject of space and rockets.

Mr. KARTH. As long as the truth is known and is available to the public, you have no objection to its dissemination?

Mr. ALLEN. That is correct.

Mr. KARTH. What do you think the Congress can do to give you greater assistance in the job that you are attempting to do, sir—and I think it is might fine. What do you think Congress can do at this session to help you do a better job, even, than the job you have done?

Mr. ALLEN. I have mentioned that one of the most interested observers of what goes on before this very committee will be the Soviet Union. If I were called before this committee again next month, I would probably bring another group of statements from Radio Moscow quoting what has been said here today, as well as statements on the floor of Congress or in political meetings that will take place.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KARTH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any statements there now, regarding this committee?

Mr. ALLEN. Well, yes; I have a statement from Tass, the Soviet news agency, of yesterday. Tass is, of course the press agency of the Soviet Government. This was in their file to all the papers that they can service in Europe, in English, from their Washington correspondent, Mr. G. Shishkin. This report is as follows:

The House of Representatives Outer Space Committee began hearings yesterday on America's lag behind the Soviet Union in space exploration. First to address this committee was the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, L. Merchant. He said that the Soviet Union had acquired terrific prestige by reaching out into space first. The remarkable nature of the Soviet achievements, he said, has undoubtedly relegated everything done by the United States to the background. The Deputy Under Secretary pointed out at the same time that despite the Soviet achievements, the United States could take the lead in space explorations.

Committee Chairman Brooks did not share Merchant's optimism. He stressed that the scale and pace of American space explorations do not justify the hopes. Showered with embarrassing questions by the chairman of the committee—

[Laughter.]

Mr. KARTH. I am sorry I started this, Mr. Chairman. I apologize.

Mr. ALLEN (reading):

Merchant was compelled to say that the U.S. Government recognizes Soviet superiority in space exploration and particularly in creating powerful rockets needed for space flight. Merchant made it clear that it is not easy to overcome this superiority, although success in this field is of great importance to U.S. foreign policy.

In the course of hearings which are expected to continue for about 6 weeks, the committee will hear testimony by military and civilian representatives of the U.S. Government, as well as scientists and industrialists.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, he won't send anything over there in favor of the United States, to show our strength and our position, will he?

Mr. ALLEN. No, no. We can't expect that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for yielding. I think it does give us a lesson in caution.

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Allen, do you think they will use any of your statement tomorrow in their Tass news release?

Mr. ALLEN. I expect they will. And you may be sure that I had that very much in mind when I drew it up.

Mr. KARTH. Yes, sir; I am sure you did.

Mr. ALLEN. At the same time, under our system, I think a representative of the executive branch of the Government when testifying before a committee of Congress must give as honest and straightforward a reply as he possibly can and let the chips fall where they may.

But when you say what can we do—

Mr. KARTH. I meant legislatively, sir. Would more money make your job more effective?

Mr. ALLEN. I am not of the type who thinks all you have to do is to spread a lot more propaganda on these situations to take care of them.

I think, under the democratic process, in open session of this kind, that intelligent human beings and men of good will, by throwing all the cards out on the table, can reach reasonable and sound decisions. That is why I think hearings of this kind are useful, in spite of the fact that I know my Soviet opposite number is going to take advantage of everything said here.

I certainly wouldn't propose that we clam up, or change our democratic system. I do think, though, as the chairman has just said, that we should feel a heavy sense of responsibility for what is said in public meetings.

Mr. KARTH. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bass.

Mr. BASS. Well, then, Mr. Allen, pursuing this particular line further, I gather you feel that any statement by congressional leaders to the effect that the United States is behind Russia in the military field or in the space field can be used as a very effective propaganda weapon against us, with the rest of the world.

Mr. ALLEN. Not only can be but will be. That doesn't mean to say, Congressman, that we ought not to have full debate on all matters pertaining to the Government's business, but I think Tass reports of this kind, if brought prominently to the attention of members of Government, will make us all feel a heavier responsibility than what we have felt up to the present.

Mr. KARTH. Would the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. BASS. Yes.

Mr. KARTH. Mr. Allen, some time ago one political party was calling the other political party a warmonger party, if I may use those words, and I use them advisedly.

Would you say this was quite detrimental to our foreign relations?

Mr. ALLEN. I would say that statements of that kind will certainly be used by the Soviet propaganda apparatus for every possible propaganda advantage they think they can get out of it.

Mr. BASS. No further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hechler.

Mr. HECHLER. Mr. Allen, I think you are on the right track. I like the way that you described the American openness in letting the world in on our failures as well as our successes.

Even though both of us deplore some of the fanfare which preceded Vanguard in 1957, I wonder if in the long run this strategy of truth won't really pay great dividends for our country.

Mr. ALLEN. I think it will but I want to be careful, Congressman—trying again to be as honest as I possibly can—to differentiate between straight factual reporting and a dramatic buildup of expectations through the manner in which it is presented, either by Government officials or by radio commentators, or by press columnists. I would plead for a truthful but dignified presentation.

Mr. HECHLER. I am in wholehearted agreement with that. I have always felt that the best public information program is one that involves some mild humility, perhaps tinged with a little pessimism now and then, coupled with concrete results. I guess you are sort of like a river. You can't rise above your source, and you have to have results in order to talk about them.

Shifting to another question, what information have you secured about the image of this country abroad in our emphasis on the production of consumer goods, luxury and our emphasis upon the frills, such as larger tail fins, rather than our desire to build the foundation of national strength, through a stronger space program, national defense, and the use of our national strength in the protection of the ideals we believe in?

Have you observed any foreign reaction to this?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, and you have opened up a very interesting question that we have to wrestle with, constantly.

For example, perhaps the most spectacular single thing my agency was concerned with during the past year was the national exhibition that we held in Moscow last summer. Upward of 3 million Russians came to see their first glimpse of the American way of life. We had to decide what kind of American way of life to present. Should we emphasize the high standard of living in the United States, the number of automobiles, bathtubs, washing machines and so forth? One of the most significant debates throughout the world, in India, in South America, and everywhere else today is how to elevate the standard of living of the masses of the people. There is great argument as to whether the Communist system is the best and quickest way to do it—whether Karl Marx is right when he says that under the capitalist system, the monopolists get more and more control of the production of wealth into their hands and the rich get richer and the poor get poorer until finally the whole thing collapses.

Now, we know that is nonsense. The capitalist system as developed in the United States has produced a very high standard of living for all of the people.

Now, are we just going to hide that under a bushel and not talk about it?

So we concluded that we had to show that the American economic system was not what Karl Marx predicted.

However, when you do too much of that, people say you are bragging about your bathtubs, washing machines, and so forth.

Mr. HECHLER. I am wondering what really attracts and inspires foreign nations. I wonder whether it is materialism. Isn't it true more people have been attracted to this Nation by its ideals? Is it not true that the best foreign information program is the Declaration of Independence and the demonstration that we are willing to produce the kind of hardware that will defend it?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. I think that our Declaration of Independence, and our concepts of human freedom and human liberty, are the best things we have to talk about in our propaganda. I often say to my staff that the best propaganda document ever turned out in the United States was our first document: The Declaration of Independence.

However, a part of our philosophy is our belief in spreading the attributes of modern economy widely among the people.

So, in addition to allowing a man to go to the church he wants to and to say what he wants to and write what he wants to, a part of the American way of life is to let a man get his fair share of the products of the industry to which he contributes. We would only be presenting one side of it if we only told about the democratic freedoms of speech and—

Mr. HECHLER. I would just like to suggest that many of the struggling masses of the world are more interested in how well we live up to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence in this country. They are more interested in that than they are in the materialistic side of our economy and how well our goods are distributed. I think you have touched on something there that is very important.

Mr. ALLEN. I have to agree, from my experience in a good many parts of the world, that say the peoples of the colored races of the world are perhaps more interested in the racial situation in the United States than they are in the economic.

Mr. HECHLER. I want to relate this to the hearing before this committee. This is the Science and Astronautics Committee. What we accomplished in the space program indicates the depth of our belief in these ideals, and the success of the American system.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Riehlman.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Allen, I am sorry I wasn't here to hear some of the questions that were asked you but I am vitally interested in knowing what your agency is doing to counteract some of this propaganda today in relation to our own position in this space age.

Mr. ALLEN. We have a very active program, Mr. Riehlman, in the whole field of science. Not only space, but in other fields of science as well. Our principal emphasis is on what the United States is doing in the scientific and technological field which is of benefit to humanity, including, of course, the great field of medicine. The United States has made far more contribution than all other countries combined in history to the eradication of malaria, for example. We have done so much more than everybody else combined; that is a story we can continue to tell, and we do, although we have to be careful not to give the impression, by emphasizing other aspects of science and space, that we are trying to get people's attention off of the space question. We also are emphasizing, as I said here earlier, that in

the very field of space itself, while the Soviet Government has achieved some very spectacular things, nevertheless we are by no means out of the picture and that seven of the present eight earth satellites spinning around the earth are American. Only one Russian sputnik is now spinning around the earth.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. What is your observation of the effect of this type of information on the minds of people around the world?

Mr. ALLEN. I have one illustration here. Recently, we put out a series of four 15-minute television programs on space activities. One of them was built around the X-15 airplane that is being prepared to shoot to the edges of outer space.

I have a report here from newspapers in Stockholm, in Brussels, in Seoul, in Manila, in Buenos Aires, Rome, Oslo, Lisbon, Tripoli, and London, where the BBC had a very long program, using primarily our films. All the reviews were very favorable to our space effort. That is just one example.

We are doing things in all our information media. We have packets of this type [indicating] that we send out to all of our posts abroad, with items on all sorts of scientific development. This is a bookshelf of scientific books that we send to all of our own overseas libraries and present to school libraries in various countries. Two of those books are on the subject of space.

I might take a second to tell the committee about our libraries. We have about 150 U.S. information libraries abroad. Nobody has developed the public library the way the United States has. We do everything we possibly can to bring people and books together. The European concept of a library grows out of the Middle Ages. It is some place way back in the back of a monastery, or a university, that is musty, and the librarian is standing there almost with a bayonet to keep people from getting at his books. He still thinks of them as rare manuscripts that somebody might steal, get dirty or tear.

We put our libraries in as conspicuous a place as we can find, in the heart of town or near the university, where as many people as possible go by. We make it as easy as possible for them to step in off the sidewalk. And we advertise, which is shocking to some of our European scholastic brethren. We have a show window. And if some subject at the moment is particularly interesting to the public, like space, we will put the latest attractive book jackets in the window, so that the people can see. We try our best to bring people and books together. That is an American concept that no other country has developed nearly as much as we have.

We have a little reading room for children, with low desks and tables and books on shelves. We have all our books right out in the open.

People go and take them off the shelf and look at them there, or sign a card and take them home.

In the field of science, we are being particularly active now because of the great interest in it.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. On page 6 of your statement, Mr. Allen, you say—

It is hardly an overstatement to say that space has become for many people a primary symbol of world leadership in all areas of science and technology. Some scientists and engineering students are being attracted to the Soviet Union for this reason.

Now, what information do you have as to the number of students that are being attracted to the Soviet Union?

Mr. ALLEN. I have no specific figures. We merely have had two or three reports. I think one of them was from Calcutta, saying that a few students who had been trying to decide where to go to study scientific developments had gone to the Soviet Union rather than to the United States.

I wouldn't want to give the impression from what I have said that this has become a sudden trend, but there is enough indication to show that Soviet successes in space have attracted some students.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. And you are referring entirely to foreign students? You don't know of any American students who have been attracted to Russia?

Mr. ALLEN. No, no, not at all.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Daddario.

Mr. DADDARIO. You have a most difficult responsibility, Mr. Allen, and I wonder if you could tell us how more complicated it becomes as other countries in Europe and throughout the world become more preoccupied with their own endeavors, with their own economic problems. And as these economic problems become settled, as they preoccupy themselves with the European Common Market and with the so-called outer seven, from an economic standpoint and they have market responsibility, they see their way clear to accomplish some of their end objectives. Isn't there a tendency there for them to isolate themselves away from us and to focus this whole world problem into a race between the Russians and ourselves?

Mr. ALLEN. There is some tendency of that type, Congressman. The first thought that ran through my mind, when you began to speak, was to comment that I hadn't seen any particular change because everybody is always more interested in his own situation than he is in any other. Consequently, it is nothing new if the people of the Common Market area are primarily interested in their own problems. But, as you explained your point of view, I think I understand what you have in mind. I concur that if the European countries, through the Common Market, are able to stand on their own feet and become more independent, economically, and therefore less dependent on the United States, there might be some little tendency for them to withdraw and say, "This space race is between the United States and the Soviet Union, and doesn't concern us very closely."

I don't believe that that is a great likelihood, but there is some possibility in that direction.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, when you quoted figures of minus 15 for England, minus 10 for France, minus 1 for Germany, and then you later on clarified that by saying that it had certain political overtones, isn't there in this somewhere a relationship, showing the direction toward which the leadership in these countries wish to head themselves? And that is away from any strong conflict which might occur between ourselves and the Russians?

Mr. ALLEN. I don't know. There might be, but I remind you again that the question asked was, "Who do you think has the overall military superiority, the Soviet Union or the United States?" I don't think you can judge that if a great majority of the people in Great

Britain say the Soviet Union has more divisions or more total overall military equipment, that that means the people of Great Britain are going to necessarily go over and side with the Soviet Union. I used the illustration that if you had taken a Gallup poll in the United States in 1939, a great many people would have said Germany had military superiority over Great Britain, but that didn't mean Americans would side with Hitler.

Mr. DADDARIO. I don't know that that is necessarily a proper analogy. We have airbases in England, we have military personnel in West Germany, and we have military personnel in connection with France. The thing that strikes me is, not where do we stand: West Germany, France, and England, together with the United States in overall potential military strength, as against the Russians, but where does the United States alone, separate and apart, stand with the Russians?

Mr. ALLEN. That is right. The question was: "Do you think the United States or Russia is ahead in total military strength at the present time?"

I have another question here that was asked which wasn't on total strength but: "Do you think the Western Powers are stronger in atomic weapons than the U.S.S.R., weaker, or about equal?"

The question includes all the Western Powers, but narrows it to atomic weapons.

On that question—atomic weapons—in June 1955, in Great Britain 34 percent more thought the Western Powers were ahead than thought that the Soviet Union was ahead.

In November 1957, the net advantage for the Western Powers had dropped from 34 to 5 percent.

In West Germany the figures are 33 percent more thought we were ahead in June of 1955 and that had dropped to 21 percent in November 1957.

In France, in June 1955, 14 percent more thought we were ahead than thought the Russians ahead in atomic weapons. In November 1957—that is just after sputnik—the percentage was minus 6 percent. A majority of Frenchmen thought the Soviets were ahead in atomic weapons.

In Italy, the percentage dropped from 23 percent in 1955 down to 16 after Sputnik I.

All these decreases took place just after Sputnik I. It shows that although sputnik had nothing to do with atomic weapons at all, yet there was a sharp change of public opinion on this subject as well.

Mr. DADDARIO. It strikes me, Mr. Allen, and I would like your opinion on this, one of the main objects of the Russians certainly is to isolate this conflict so that it is a conflict between the United States and Russia, with the other countries left off by themselves. Everything I hear here today seems to focus the conflict in that direction and it then gets us to the point. Isn't there a possibility that if we keep going along on this road and if the feeling about Russian superiority as reflected in these figures in England, France, and West Germany, keeps manifesting itself, that we can look toward the day when Europe would desire to be isolated from the conflict? If they could then be convinced by the Russians that they would not be subject to attack, this whole world conflict could be isolated into Asia, away

from Europe, and could be consolidated in that manner between ourselves and the Russians?

Mr. ALLEN. I think that is a very good point, Congressman, and it reinforces the brief statement I had in my opening statement which I would be very happy to elaborate on. I said that there is some talk of Britain building the instrumentation for an earth satellite. We would supply the booster, but Britain would supply the satellite itself. I think that would be an excellent thing. And I would like to see the French and the Italians and the Germans and various other people—maybe smaller nations—get into the act. Nothing would interest them more, in this space picture, than to have one of their satellites beeping around the world, and it might lead away from the thing that you have so rightly pointed to as a possibility—that other people will wash their hands of it and say, “There is a contest between the United States and the U.S.S.R. which is no concern of ours. We are not interested.”

Furthermore, one of the most important things in this whole space picture, in my opinion, is to get an international agreement on the peaceful uses of space. It is a very pressing thing, I think. If we can get more countries interested in it, they will tend to concern themselves with an international agreement on space.

Mr. DADDARIO. Well, in other words, you feel that there ought to be—and I quite agree with you—that all of these countries ought to feel as though they are still in this same ball game on our side.

Mr. ALLEN. Exactly.

Mr. DADDARIO. And that they are not to be put in a position of just becoming spectators?

Mr. ALLEN. That is right.

Mr. DADDARIO. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. King.

Mr. KING. Mr. Allen, first of all, I should like to congratulate you on what I think is a very excellent, illuminating statement, one of the outstanding statements I have heard during my year's membership on this committee. I started out by underlining the portions of your testimony that I thought were important and I ended up by underlining practically everything in your testimony.

I might say also I have had some experience with the Voice of America. I had the opportunity of participating in four broadcasts in the French language, working with Mr. Stefan Osusky, whom I found to be a man of great competence, of commendable comprehension of the processes of our Government. I think he is doing a very splendid job. He has shown me many of the broadcasts he has put together and I want to commend your department for that type of work.

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. KING. Now, much has been said this morning about this matter of, shall we say, self-analysis. Some of it going perhaps too far, recklessness in our self-analysis, and the detrimental effect that that has had on our promotion efforts abroad. I agree with everything that has been said, to this point: I agree that it is very bad to indulge in reckless statements. Statements, for example, that the Russian military posture is more favorable than ours. I think such a statement made publicly by a responsible official is not only untrue, but I think very damaging. So all that has been said along that line I agree with.

But I would add this thought and I ask you to comment on it: It seems to me we should not infer from that, for 1 minute, that we can no longer indulge in a good healthy self-analysis and self-criticism. It seems to me that that has always been the strength of the American system. And I would be far more worried if we got to the point where we were afraid to examine and confess our own weaknesses, even though we did it publicly. I would be more worried over that fact than I would be worried over the fact that we made some unfavorable statements public from which the opposition could gather a publicity advantage.

That is also a danger but it seems to me the lesser of the two dangers. It seems to me that the strength and vitality of our form of government has always been rooted in the fact that we were free to discuss our own weaknesses as well as our own strength. And this being a democracy, it seems to me that it is most important that the American public be kept apprised at all times of just where we stand.

For example, if it be true, and I think it is, that the Russians are turning out twice as many scientists and three times as many engineers as we are—I have seen that statement in print several times—if that be true, I think the American people should know about it, even though that may do us a little damage propagandawise abroad.

I think the greater danger would be for the American people to fail to realize that fact. They should know it. That is particularly true in our form of government where everything we do has to be supported by the people and especially by the taxpayers. They have to pay the bill. They are entitled to know what they are paying for and what the great needs and urgencies are.

Now, specifically, I think you go along in general with what I have said and you made the statement that you feel we should not indulge in—I think you said we should have an adult attitude on this, and I agree with that.

I am wondering if you would care to expand just a little more as to what you would consider legitimate type of self-criticism and self-analysis, which is acceptable, in contrast to the uncalled for, juvenile or hysterical attitude that might cause us damage abroad.

Would you like to discuss that?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes. I want to say I concur heartily that the American people should know the facts. Either we have to have criticism in our system of government or else we must adopt some other system, and certainly I would not propose that.

The principal thought that I have on a more adult approach would be along this line: First and foremost, we should recognize that the United States is going to have a problem in the propaganda field, because of our system, and should try to minimize the difficulties and not get too worried because of public opinion overseas.

We Americans are inclined to feel badly hurt when we see figures going against us, such as I have read.

Now, I am certainly not proposing an ostrich attitude—that we pay no attention to public opinion overseas. On the other hand, I am asking for a commonsense middle ground. We should not get frustrated by it. Along the lines you have been bringing out, we should not

shut off healthy inquiry or investigations such as this committee is carrying on, regarding what we are doing in space.

I don't think we ought to let world opinion be the be-all, and end-all, of what we do, but we should not ignore it. That is the more adult attitude I had in mind.

Mr. KING. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Allen, I want to tell you this, that I think you have made a very excellent, well-balanced feet-on-the-ground statement that should help the committee attain a sense of responsibility as Members of Congress in issuing statements. Likewise, it gives us a very good idea of world opinion and its importance to this country as well as the importance of the space program in fashioning world opinion. We do appreciate your statement.

I want to ask you one final question, and I think it is a key question: Is it of importance, psychologically that we view space as a race, a race in which we must win at all cost?

Mr. ALLEN. I think that is an extreme statement that I would not subscribe to.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not a statement, it is a question.

Mr. ALLEN. If you put it in a positive way and ask whether we should regard space as a vital race which we must win at all costs, you would use extreme language that I couldn't subscribe to.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you agree if we left off "at all costs"?

Mr. ALLEN. If it were put a little more in perspective, I might go along. I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that I think no matter what we feel about it or how we may want it to be, we are in a space race with the Soviet Union. We can't deny it and we can't avoid it, I don't think.

The CHAIRMAN. We might as well accept it?

Mr. ALLEN. We might as well accept it. Public opinion in the United States as well as overseas is going to put up what the Russians have done against what we have done. Every time the Russians do something, it is going to be marked up on a sort of chart. We are in a contest. There is no doubt about that, and so no matter what we want to do about it, we are in this race.

The CHAIRMAN. And you don't want to run second in the race, do you?

Mr. ALLEN. I don't want to run second in the race. If you were to say, though, that we ought to put aside all military activities in regard to missiles and put everything we have got on space because it is absolutely vital that we win that one, I think we might win a battle but lose the war.

The CHAIRMAN. And we wouldn't want certainly to give up freedoms, for instance, to win space?

Mr. ALLEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. We wouldn't want to give up the right of free speech to win space, but summing it up, you would say it was a very vital program for us to win?

Mr. ALLEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And that we as a nation, don't want to run second in a space race?

Mr. ALLEN. And at the present moment, I think the contest is primarily on who is going to put the first man up there.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Monday morning we will have the Secretary of the Defense Department as a witness and I would like very much to have a full attendance. We will adjourn.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee adjourned to reconvene Monday, January 25, 1960.)